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JoyaTeemer — Thu, 20 May 2010 19:05:10 GMT

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"Postmodernism” is on the lips of many people. For some, it evokes all
that is good and exciting about intellectual advance during the past
three decades or so; for others, it signals the abandonment of truth, the
adoption of nihilism, multiplied confusion, and God-defying arrogance.
For many others, its meaning is unclear. They know it is something they are supposed
to be excited about or concerned over, but they are not quite sure what it is.

The meaning of postmodernism is not transparent. Moreover, its range of
application—it has been applied to literature, art, communication theory, architecture,
epistemology, jurisprudence, the philosophy of science, and more—means that
its associations for one person may be very different from its associations for someone
else. Seventy-five years ago a particular architectural style was called “modern.”
Then style changed; so what should the new style be called? If “modern” refers to
the contemporary, then every style should be called “modern” in turn, at least for a
while. But because “modern” had been attached to the previous style, the new style
that displaced it had to be called something else. So the new style was called “postmodern.”
Something similar has happened in several domains.

Still, one use of the label “postmodern” very largely holds the rest of its uses
together. This is its use in the field of epistemology. Epistemology is the study of how
people know things—or at least of how they think that they know them. Initially, this
sounds terribly abstruse. For the practical (like those, for instance, who repair their
own automobiles), it can sound downright silly, like medieval debates over the number
of angels that can dance on the head of a pin. Yet we have all adopted some form
of epistemology. We come to our beliefs—those things that we claim to know—by a
wide range of means. But when we move outside our usual circles (especially if we
travel much and listen well), we become aware that many people see things very differently.
They dismiss as bunk what we take as obvious. For example, while
Americans mourned after 9/11, many Muslims
danced in the street. We knew that the destruction
of the twin towers in New York and the violence
against the Pentagon in Washington were evil acts
of terrorism, while they knew that they were just and
courageous deeds, sanctioned and blessed by Allah.
Here are two competing truth-claims. But what are
truth-claims? And how does one “know” them?
Christians need to think about epistemology.

We shall gain a better appreciation of the role
epistemology plays if we indulge in a quick historical
survey, before summarizing the strengths and
weaknesses of postmodern epistemology.

'''Premodern Epistemology'''

“Premodern” here refers to the period from
the late Middle Ages through the
Reformation to the dawn of the
Enlightenment (c. A.D. 1200–1600). For most
Europeans during that time an account of human
knowing would go something like this: God exists
and knows everything. We human beings, made in
his image, know only an infinitesimal part of what
God knows. In fact, if we are to know anything, then
we must come to know some part of what God
already perfectly knows—and so revelation is
required. Revelation can come through Scripture or
the church’s teachings or by the Spirit’s illumination
or through experience or by means of what we today
call “science.” (For these premoderns, the means or
locus of revelation was not as important as its reality.)
On this general point, Thomas Aquinas and John
Calvin agree: human knowing is a small subset of
God’s knowing and comes to us by revelation.
Where they differ is on how much revelation is given
through each means. Aquinas was convinced that
enough was revealed through nature and experience
that someone could, by paying proper attention to
these sources of “natural revelation,” gain some significant
knowledge about God. By contrast, Calvin
was convinced that “special” revelation—revelation
coming through Scripture, the Spirit, and the
church—was necessary for us to know anything
about God in the way that we should.

Premodern epistemology was very open to the
supernatural. That meant it held countless millions
(at least on the popular level) in thrall to beliefs and
“knowledge” that most of us would dismiss as
laughable today: silly superstitions, the magical
powers of relics, high confidence in omens and
astrology. The Reformation significantly weakened
some of these beliefs. Yet it is worth noting
that even this epistemology—which was substantially
correct in recognizing that all human knowing
is a subset of God’s knowing and consequently
a function of revelation—could nevertheless be
corrupted by sinful human beings and thus coupled
with indefensible superstition.

'''Modern Epistemology'''

Modern epistemology arose by moving
away from God to the autonomous individual.
It begins with the “I.” Historians
often point to René Descartes as the crucial transitional
figure. Early in the seventeenth century he
saw that many of his acquaintances in the intellectual
world were rejecting both premodern epistemology
and Christianity. Some of them were atheists. So
he sought for a common intellectual base, a foundation
on which both he and they could build their
beliefs. He eventually settled on his famous axiom,
“I think, therefore I am” (in Latin, ''cogito, ergo sum'').

Descartes was not a skeptic. He was Roman
Catholic all his life. He published his acceptance
of this axiom—along with a number of other philosophical
claims that have not stood the test of
time—in the 1630s; and it exerted wide influence.
Descartes was convinced that whatever else might
be doubted, as long as “I” am a thinking being “I”
cannot doubt my own existence, for there must be
an “I” who is doing the thinking. Hence, “I think,
therefore I am.” Here, surely, was a foundation that
he and his skeptical friends could share. And
Descartes was persuaded that from this foundation
he could erect an argument that would move people
toward theism and even Christianity.

The critical elements that sprang out of his
work and developed into modern epistemology
can be summarized as follows: (1) The foundation
of our knowledge is no longer God in his omniscience,
but “I,” the human knower. So human
knowledge is no longer seen as a subset of God’s
knowledge but as something grounded in nothing
more than each of our existences as individual thinking
beings. (2) It is assumed that absolute certainty—
a certainty borne of true knowledge—is both
desirable and attainable. (3) The structure of human
knowledge and certainty is profoundly “foundationalist.”
Descartes looked for a commonly acceptable
“foundation” on which he could build all the rest of
human knowledge—what we might call the “superstructure”
of human knowledge, including our belief
in God and in the existence of a world that exists
independently of our consciousness. Foundationalism
has been assumed in most modern disciplines
from history to microbiology to particle physics. In
each discipline there are axioms, fundamental
assumptions, and then conclusions that are built
upon those axioms and assumptions. Usually, the
autonomy of human knowing—that is, its independence
from God’s knowledge—is either an
explicit or implicit part of these disciplines. (4) To
establish rigor and control in each discipline, there is
a strong emphasis on method. Until very recently, a
doctoral dissertation in the Western world has been
checked as much for its methodological rigor as for
its results. In other words, in modern epistemology
we start with an adequate foundation, add methodological
rigor, turn the crank, and out pops truth. (5)
Truth itself is understood to enjoy what some have
called “ahistorical universality”—that is, if something
is true, it is true everywhere, at all times, for all
peoples, in all cultures and languages. If we can
show that water is made up of two atoms of hydrogen
and one of oxygen, then that is as true in Peru
and Pango Pango as it is in Mexico City or Medicine
Hat. It was true in A.D. 1300 and it is true in A.D.
2003. Real truth is objective truth that transcends
culture and history. It is true whether anyone
believes it or not; and that is why it is to be pursued
and cherished. (6) Although it was certainly not so
in Descartes’s time or for a long time afterwards,
modern epistemology has increasingly been linked
in the Western world to naturalistic assumptions.
Naturalism claims there is
nothing more than matter,
energy, space, and time.
Modern epistemology was
originally developed primarily
by theists (many of whom
were Christians) and deists.
Darwin, however, made atheism
intellectually respectable; and so in the twentieth
century modern epistemology was increasingly
linked to naturalism, not only in scientific circles,
but also in the sweeping rise and fall of communism
and fascism.

'''Postmodern Epistemology'''

So what about postmodern epistemology? Of
course, history is messy. The transition from
one historical movement to another is not
abrupt. Invariably, some forces prepare the way for a
shift and others retard it. And even when there is a
new paradigm, not everyone adopts it. Even today
many modernists argue for their corner and many
other thinkers have mixed epistemological pedigrees.

Even during the reign of modern epistemology,
there were many anticipations that all was not
well. Yet for convenience we may accept the common
assessment that postmodern epistemology
came to prominence in much of the Western world
about 1970. It is usefully analyzed with reference
to its rejection or modification of all six of the elements
of modern epistemology.

1. Postmodern epistemology continues to fasten
on the finite “I”—or, more corporately, on the finite
group, the “we.” But it draws very different inferences
from this axiom than modern epistemology
did. Because all human knowers—or groups of
knowers—are finite, they think and reason out of a
specific and limited cultural framework, some specific
“interpretive community.” I am a white, middle-
aged, European Canadian, with a reasonable
amount of Western education behind me, and a
white-collar job. Surely it is not surprising if I look
at things differently than, say, a sub-Saharan
African scholar or a twelve-year-old illiterate street
prostitute in Bangkok.

2. Reflect deeply on the first point, postmodernism
insists, and absolute certainty will no longer
be assumed to be possible. To be frank, it is mere
illusion, the product of disreputable arrogance.
Moreover, absolute certainty is not even desirable.
It engenders a narrow outlook and cascading selfrighteousness.
Surely it is better, postmoderns tell
us, to encourage insights that flow from many different
perspectives, including different religions
and diverse moral codes.

3. Because the “foundations” that we erect are
produced by finite human thought, we should abandon
the comfortable illusion that they are secure.
Postmodernism is profoundly anti-foundationalist.

4. Similarly, as finite human beings we invent
our methods, which are themselves shaped by particular
languages and cultures and social groupings.
Consequently, no method has any deeper significance
than the preference or convenience of some
particular group. To hold, as modernists did, that
to build on a firm foundation with rigorous methods
would enable us to uncover truth was self-delusion,
for neither our foundations nor our methods
transcend our limitations.

5. From these first four points we must infer that
whatever “truth” we discover cannot possibly enjoy
“ahistorical universality.” It will be true for one culture,
but not another; it will be true in one language,
but not in another; it will be true for this
social grouping, but not for that one. Even in the
scientific domain, it is argued, we are learning that
large theories are not infrequently overthrown by
later theories, that Western medicine has its triumphs
and failures while Chinese medicine can
make similar claims, and so on. Any claim to have
achieved “ahistorical universality” is just one more
form of modernist hubris.

6. Many postmodern voices still speak out of
the assumptions of philosophical naturalism that
are common among late modernist thinkers. Yet
substantial numbers of postmoderns are now convinced
that there are many, many ways to “knowledge”
and “truth”—i.e., to “knowledge” and “truth”
that are helpful to you or your “interpretive community.”
They will happily applaud traditional science,
while anticipating the breakthroughs that
will come by “feeling” rather than thinking (“Feel,
Luke, feel!”). They accept both astrology and religious
claims because they do not take them to be
different in kind. Anecdotal evidence is as persuasive
to such people as controlled, double-blind scientific
experiments. Consequently, many postmoderns
think of themselves as more “spiritual” and
less “naturalistic” than their modernist forebears.

'''The Correlatives of Postmodernism'''

Many complex social factors interact with
postmodern epistemology without necessarily
being either its causes or its
effects. For instance, significant shifts are taking
place in the processes of secularization, in our
assumptions about the nature of tolerance, in our
approaches to religion and morality, in our
strengthened individualism, in our estimations of
what is important, in our rising biblical illiteracy,
and especially in our unrestrained devotion to horizontal,
social analyses that squeeze out God. These
developments often strengthen postmodern epistemology
as well as often being strengthened by it.
For example, the more biblically illiterate our culture
becomes, the less likely we will be to retain our
Judeo-Christian roots and the more open we will be
to the pluralism that postmodernism strengthens.
In that sense, biblical illiteracy may be a contributing
cause of postmodernism. Conversely, the
stronger the hold that postmodernism exercises on
the culture, the less incentive there is to read the
Bible as an authoritative revelation. In that sense,
biblical illiteracy may be one of the results of the
impact of postmodernism on the culture. It is similar
with each of the other factors I have mentioned.

What we must recognize is that Christians should
not adopt either modern or postmodern epistemology.
Both epistemologies make some important and
true claims; and each also makes claims that
Christians will want to deny. Some Christians, intuitively
sensing the dangers of postmodern epistemology,
pan it entirely, reverting to the more familiar
modern epistemology. They conveniently forget
that epistemological modernism has not always been
the Christian’s friend. Others cherish postmodernism,
not least because of its freshness and iconoclasm.
They view askance anything that has ties to
old-fashioned modernism. So what is required is
some evenhanded reflection on both the strengths
and the weaknesses of postmodern epistemology.

'''Strengths of Postmodernism'''

1. Postmodernism tellingly criticizes modernism’s
vaunted autonomy and firmly checks its
considerable arrogance. This is no small gain.
Epistemological modernism has encouraged us to
think that human beings enjoy both the right and
the ability to stand in judgment of God. It does not
easily allow us to see the fundamental obscenity
implied in obscuring our dependence upon him; it
is too busy thinking large thoughts about human
beings and our potential, and small thoughts about
everything we see and study, including God.
Postmodernism is properly sober about human finitude.
Rightly applied, that is a great gain.

2. Postmodernism is much more sensitive than
modernism to the deep and undeniable differences
that characterize people of different races, languages,
ages, cultures, and genders. For about ten
years I worked part-time for the World Evangelical
Fellowship, organizing a number of conferences that
brought together theologians and senior pastors
from many corners of the world. Just watching
these people coming into a room and greeting one
another was an education. As the groups discussed
papers and tried to reach consensus as to what
Scripture says, we all became aware of the different
baggage that we each carried, to say nothing of different
cultural expectations about what was courteous,
what was funny, what was persuasive, and so on.
Postmodernism’s emphasis on the finiteness of the “I”
has made us rejoice in cultural difference and made
us suspicious of haughty cultural hegemony. That is
not all bad. It reminds us of the enormous role of
presuppositions in all human knowing. Of course,
that is why Jesus’ disciples, prior to the cross, had no
category for a crucified Messiah (e.g., Matt.
16:21ff.), even though Jesus repeatedly explained
the notion. It took the cross and the Resurrection
for the pieces to come together in their minds.

3. Postmodernism articulates what we should have
known but what modernism made difficult to see,
namely, that there is more to human knowing than
rationality, proofs, evidences, and linear thought. No
matter how much we retain the view that evidence and
logic are fundamental to human reflection and discourse,
we are now much more aware of the way that
aesthetic, social, intuitive, linguistic, and other factors
influence our thinking. Postmoderns are often more
impressed by the authenticity of relationships than by
the brilliance of linear argument. And for Christians
that, surely, is a plus, because Christians are to be known
by their love for one another (see John 13:34–35).
Invite a biblically literate postmodern into a Christian
family or Christian church that overflows with love,
integrity, and compassion, and the most challenging elements
of “apologetics” have already been looked after.

4. Postmodernism is implicitly religiously pluralistic,
as was the Roman Empire in the Apostle
Paul’s time and for several centuries after that. The
imperial government in Rome made it a capital
offense to desecrate a temple—any temple—for
the rulers were determined to prevent religious differences
from erupting into bloodshed. Moreover,
pagan defenses against Christianity assumed that
all religions are valuable and lead to “god.” From a
Christian perspective, this assumption is not a
good thing. Nevertheless, this pagan outlook
increasingly characterizes today’s Western culture.
Developments like these may
not be very honorable, but
they have at least one beneficial
side effect: Many of the
New Testament documents—
and especially those
depicting the church in a
gentile setting—speak much more immediately
and prophetically to our situation than they did to
Western Christians half a century ago. For example,
Paul’s address to the Athenians (see Acts
17:17–34) and his letter to the Colossians now
bristle with immediate and urgent relevance. So
postmodern cultural trends have played a crucial
role in enabling many of us to read our Bibles with
fresh eyes and from a slant that is very close to the
one adopted by the New Testament’s first readers.

'''Weaknesses of Postmodernism'''

Yet we must not be naive. Postmodernism
has many weaknesses.

1. It habitually exaggerates the difficulties we have
in communicating with one another. This is perhaps
most amusingly demonstrated when postmoderns
accuse their reviewers of not really reading their
books closely and carefully. In other words, in spite
of their theories, postmoderns expect their critics to
treat their published works fairly, in line with their
authorial intent as displayed in their text, although
this runs against some of their postmodern claims.

2. Postmodernism pushes its claim that all knowing
is subjective by regularly presenting us with a
frankly manipulative antithesis: Either we finite
human beings can know things omnisciently or we
are necessarily adrift on the sea of “knowledge” without
a compass and without a shore. But this antithesis
is appalling: it demands that we be God or lost in
subjectivity. In reality, as premodern epistemology
understood, we may know some true things but
never in an omniscient manner; we may know that
certain things are objectively true but never with the
absolute certainty accorded to God alone.
Recognizing this allows us to construct models of
human knowing that are much closer to what each
of us actually experiences than what either modern
or postmodern epistemology give us. But if we permit
this absolute antithesis to stand, then postmoderns
will always win the epistemological debate.

3. When postmodern thinking is applied to
realms such as doctrine and morals, it does more to
loosen the constraints of living with integrity and
with self-denying concern for others (to say nothing
of living with a high regard for orthodoxy) than
any other single development in the past century.
This thinking erupts not only in courses in cultural
anthropology (which today could not possibly condemn,
say, child sacrifice, since doubtless the practice
was very meaningful to its practitioners) but in
our science fiction (e.g., Star Trek: Voyagers never
tires of story lines in which alien cultures with
behavior and stances utterly abominable in our eyes
are in reality no less fine than our own—it all
depends on one’s point of view). It makes us
uncomfortable with concepts like “the faith that was
once for all delivered to the saints” (Jude 3) or with
a defined gospel, the abandonment of which is
nothing other than the rejection of God, a rejection
that spells anathema (see Gal. 1:6, 8–9).

Postmodernism’s more radical forms are hopelessly
deficient when it is important to talk about
truth. By exaggerating the challenges we face
when we try to communicate with others (the first
point), and by deploying an unnecessary and
manipulative antithesis (the second point), postmodernism
destroys the objectivity of truth.
Postmoderns correctly perceive that there can
never be, among finite knowers, an uninterpreted
truth. But from this they incorrectly infer that
there cannot be any knowledge of objective truth
at all. Radical hermeneutics (with German roots),
radical appeals to the nature of language (developed
in France), and radical claims in the social sciences
(from America) have conspired to convince
us that objective knowledge is forever beyond us.
Nothing, however, has actually been shown except
that omniscient, objective knowledge is forever
beyond us. But we finite human beings can know
some things objectively, even if nonomnisciently;
we can know in the only ways that finite beings can
ever know—with such a powerful degree of
approximation to what is really true that it serves
no purpose to say that we do not know objectively.
Our knowledge is always in principle correctable,
as all finite knowledge must be, but it is not for that
reason not knowledge. And Christians can add
that our knowledge is all the more securely based
because God, with his omniscient mind, has chosen
to disclose himself to us in human words. The
implications of this revelation cannot be teased out
here, but they are of staggering importance.

4. After rightly challenging the sheer arrogance
of modernist epistemology, postmodernism displays
its own brand of arrogance. Postmoderns are
so certain that uncertainty is our lot that they insist
that even if there were a God who spoke and disclosed
himself, we could not possibly know that he
had. This is stunning arrogance, arrogance of a
form that goes on to transform what has traditionally
been called “tolerance” into a new and terrifying
intolerance. In the past, I might insist that
some claim is nonsense, but I would defend to the
death the right of others to claim it. In other
words, I might strongly disagree with certain ideas,
but I would tolerate the person upholding them.
But under this new, postmodern view of “tolerance,”
we are tolerant only if we take all claims to
be equally valid. Those who challenge this view
are taken to be intolerant—and they should not be
given any respect or attention, because they are so
intolerant. Thus postmoderns have infinite tolerance
for all ideas—though why it should be called
“tolerance” when they cannot disagree with any of
these ideas is not transparent: Can I properly be
said to tolerate what I do not disagree with, but display
no tolerance whatsoever for those who disagree
with their postmodern ideology?

'''Concluding Reflections'''

This essay does not respond to postmodernism
systematically. That would demand
quite a different piece. Still less have I
attempted to sketch an alternative Christian epistemology,
although astute readers will detect the
direction I would take. My point has been simpler.
Informed Christians will neither idolize nor demonize
either postmodernism or modernism. Both
are founded on profoundly idolatrous assumptions.
And both make some valuable observations that,
when they are properly integrated into a more biblically
faithful frame of reference, enable us to
reflect fruitfully on the world in which we live.

So here are, simultaneously, some of the blessings
of common grace and some of the distortions
of fallen, would-be autonomous rebels.

The Dangers and Delights of Postmodernism - Revision history

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